

MOZAMBIQUE

REVOLUTION

Northwestern University
Library

FEB 1 1972

Periodical



MOZAMBIQUE

REVOLUTION

Official organ of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

July - September, 1971

No. 48

*Department of Information
P.O.Box 15274
Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania*

CONTENTS

MESSAGE

from the president of frelimo on the
day of the mozambican revolution 1

ALLIANCE AGAINST IMPERIALISM

frelimo's visit to socialist countries 5

WAR COMMUNIQUE

report from the military front 8

THE UNITED NATIONS: ONE STEP FORWARD

role of un specialised agencies 9

WAR REVIEW

analysis of the political and military situation
over the last twelve months 11

END OF A MISSION

why the white fathers left mozambique 19

VISITORS IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE

six journalists and cameramen from soviet union
and a representative of the union of secondary
schools of finland 23

GUINE: 12 YEARS AFTER PIJIGUITI

frelimo's statement on the national day of
guine-bissau 28

SEPTEMBER 25

A message from the President of FRELIMO to the fighters and people of Mozambique

Comrades,

Today we are celebrating our Revolution's most important day. We are celebrating the day on which our armed struggle for national liberation started. We are celebrating the day which enabled us to become what we are: a conscious and united people, a people with a country, a people creating a new society through struggle and sacrifice.

The companies that are disappearing, the machila that is beginning to be forgotten, the administration, the palmatoria the colonialist taxes, the forced labour — all that started to die on 25 September.

The schools and hospitals, the co-operatives — everything that has been created and is growing in our country was born on 25 September.

It is true that most of our country is still not free, is owned by the companies. It is true that most of our people are still not free, are enslaved people sold to the mines in South Africa, imprisoned people held in concentration camps, humiliated people receiving orders from foreigners.

All this is true, what we have accomplished and what remains to be done.

And we already know, we can already measure, the concrete and real advantages that the struggle is bringing to our people; this enables us to understand the direction in which we are heading.

The seventh year of war is ending, the eighth is beginning. A year is ending in which our struggle has been consolidated and expanded. With the seventh year, our certainty of victory grew and the confidence in our political line grew as well. With the eighth year, our freedom will become even more real, just as the ignominious defeat of Portuguese colonialism will become more real.

In 1970, the enemy tried to win a quick victory and met with defeat. This year, 1971, they have tried to be more flexible, less adventurous, they have attempted to combine crimes against our people with political manoeuvres aimed at sowing confusion. This too has failed.

After the end of the dry season, our fighters south of the Zambezi had created the conditions for expanding the armed struggle. By the end of the year, the flames of war had already attained the southern bank of the Zambezi. Nothing succeeded in preventing the spread of the war, neither the

aircraft criss-crossing the Zambezi, the constant patrols along the banks, the driving out of the population, the destruction of boats, nor the murder of peasants and fishermen crossing the river in the course of their daily work.

South of the axis Montepuez — Porto Amélia, south of Mecanhelas, along the outer limits of the eastern zone of Niassa, south and east of the Zambezi, the great fire which consumes colonialism is spreading, touching even more the enemy nerve centres. Faced with this expanding struggle, the enemy are trying to reorganise the deployment of their forces, evacuating certain positions, reinforcing others, intensifying bombing raids with more than two dozen aircraft and stepping up their helicopter incursions into our areas.

As a result of the constant attacks against their posts, as a result of the ever greater losses they are suffering, the enemy are now withdrawing from certain strategic posts. But this situation must not create a feeling of victory, leading to a superiority complex and a slackening of vigilance and discipline among the fighters and people. We must always remember that the enemy's withdrawal from certain strategic positions does not mean that they are withdrawing from Mozambique. The enemy are withdrawing because our struggle is advancing. By withdrawing they are enabling us to gain ground but, in so doing, they would also have us believe that they have become weak, so as to promote the growth of ambition, division and corruption, making some think that we are already independent just because the enemy have already evacuated their region, as if an arm could live severed from its body. This situation in which the enemy are stepping up their political manoeuvres at the same time as evacuating certain regions is one that cadres need to seriously study.

This year, because the enemy armed forces suffered heavy reverses, because the combat zone expanded and because our forces maintained a consistent offensive, despite all their intentions and threats, the enemy were incapable of launching any large-scale ground offensive. Hence the intensification of their criminal and barbarous acts against the people: massacres of the population, bombing raids, incursions against granaries and cultivated plots, and the burning and looting of villages. Portuguese terrorist action is being cynically combined with psychological action aimed at leading the people astray with political promises which are as demagogic as they are devoid of content, like the promise of autonomy, for example. This situation, this new tactic of enemy duplicity, requires that we analyse the present situation.

The liberation war is beginning to press at the enemy's nerve centres. The extent of Portuguese losses in both lives and material is rapidly increasing. The areas of confrontation are expanding in all directions. The colonialists are finding themselves in the position of a man surrounded by a number of fires who rushes to put out the fire on his right only to feel the flames on his left burning more intensely. The colonialists are disorientated. They had thought that with operation «Gordian Knot», in 1970, they could have quenched the flames in Cabo Delgado. The flames were not put out in Cabo Delgado and the fire has spread south of the Zambezi and Montepuez — Porto Amélia. Then they tried to concentrate on Cahora Bassa, only to realise that our fighters had transformed Cahora Bassa into an island, isolated from the rest of the country. The Portuguese enemy realises how immense has been their failure, but they cannot accept their defeat.

The enemy is now trying to achieve three objectives in the hope of saving their interests:

1. To change the nature of our war.
2. To further internationalise the war.
3. To sow confusion among us.

Our war is a war of national liberation against Portuguese colonialism, against imperialism and against the exploitation of man by man. The colonialists want our war to cease being a struggle against the exploiters and to be transformed into a war against the Portuguese people, to stop being against imperialism and to become a war between the black people of Mozambique and the white population in Mozambique, a racist war. In order to achieve this objective, Portugal is systematically driving the African people from their fertile lands and settling European people there.

When the Portuguese government drives Mozambicans from their land in order to put settlers there, their prime aim is to force the emergence of contradictions between the Mozambican and Portuguese peoples. In so doing, colonialism will tell the white farmers that they must defend their land against the Africans, at the same time creating in the African population a feeling of hatred for those who have occupied their land. Transforming the nature of our war and making us become confused as to the identity of the enemy, would be to create confusion as to who should be the target of our bullets.

A very great responsibility faces FRELIMO and the Mozambican people in avoiding any perversion of the content of our struggle, making the masses ever more deeply aware of the identity of the enemy and making the Portuguese and white Mozambicans understand that our struggle is not directed against them, that they have only to gain from the defeat of colonialism and Portuguese fascism.

The colonialists are also trying to further internationalise their war against our people. Although enemy forces already number more than 70,000 men brought from Portugal, these forces are not able to deter the advance of our forces. All Portuguese attempts to impede our advance have failed and resulted in growing losses among the Portuguese troops.

On the other hand, the advance of the struggle in Angola and Guiné, the appearance of armed anti-colonialist action in Portugal itself and the great number of desertions from the Portuguese forces are preventing the enemy High Command from significantly increasing their total strength in Mozambique. Therefore, Portugal, which claims to be protecting Mozambique from foreign invasion, is bringing foreign troops into Mozambique. Portugal, which claims not to be racist, is instal-

'The eighth year of struggle will mark even bigger advances'



Speaking to the people: Com. Samora Machel.

ling racist troops from racist South Africa and racist Rhodesia in Mozambique. Portugal, which is always screaming that our struggle is financed and sustained from abroad, is not only bringing mercenaries to Mozambique, but is also begging its imperialist masters for money and aid.

Two countries have already sent their troops to Mozambique: South Africa and Rhodesia. Only this April, the Rhodesian government itself announced the death of its soldiers and destruction of its vehicles during operations in Mozambique. Aircraft and helicopters from these two countries are taking part in countless operations against our forces. Foreign mercenaries are being used in our country. Foreign military advisers are coming to Mozambique disguised as civilian technicians.

Showing consistent contempt for the interests of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guiné, contempt for the Portuguese people's opposition and contempt for African and world opinion, NATO is stepping up its criminal aid to Portugal. The leaders of world imperialism — the United States, Federal Germany, Britain and France — are no longer seeking hypocritical pretexts, but openly supplying Portugal with money and arms, publicly training new war criminals and even sending military advisers, as they did most recently last June. The United States, France, Britain and South Africa are ringing Mozambique with naval and air bases, on the pretext of defending the Cape route, which is threatened by no one more than imperialism. This growing internationalisation of the war of aggression against our people is aimed at prolonging the war against Mozambique and at making our people capitulate before the demands and manoeuvres of imperialism.

We are mobilised to fight and win a protracted people's war. We are in a position increasingly to transform our growing political consciousness into a material force which will crush the enemy, no matter how powerful they may be. The unity achieved among us, the dividing line that has been drawn between us and the reactionary elements, the clarification of our political line and the purification that has taken place within our ranks, have given our organisation new vigour, strengthening the masses' confidence in FRELIMO and the leadership, making the people deeply aware of the objectives of the struggle.

All this created the conditions for the masses to assume our revolutionary ideology, that is, for them to transform correct ideas into a material force, a material force which gave rise to the vigilance which exposed infiltrated subversive agents, a material force which has defeated the enemy's criminal offensives, a material force which has resulted in our present successes.

Finally, our enemy would like to foment subversion, to sow confusion in order to divide, weaken and ultimately annihilate us, and this is certainly their major aim. The terrorist campaign of bombing and slaughtering our people, the destruction of crops, granaries, school and hospitals, the infiltration of agents, are all aimed at intimidating the people, at robbing the people of the initiative and rendering them passive, forcing them to capitulate, obliging the people to seek exile abroad or to accept being imprisoned in concentration camps. The planes with loudspeakers, the millions of leaflets dropped and the constant radio programmes are aimed solely at weakening the morale of the fighters and sowing confusion among the cadres. This situation, the enemy's present intentions and actions, clearly proves two things: that we are working correctly and that our struggle is steadily advancing.

But this positive fact should not be a source of contentment. We should not be filled with a feeling of victory. We should be satisfied with the work done, but concerned about the work still to be done.

Three provinces are at war, but six others are not. More than a million Mozambicans are living in freedom, but another seven million are enslaved. About a quarter of our territory has been liberated, but three-quarters still has to be liberated. There are still many unresolved problems in the liberated areas. The medical care is not sufficient, the number of schools is very far from meeting our needs and production still falls short of meeting all the requirements of the people and the war. We feel that there are still shortcomings in our political work among the masses, limitations in the consciousness of cadres and fighters and inadequacies in our technical knowledge.

We are listing our weak points so as to locate the wounds in order to treat them. Of course, if we look at our past weaknesses, we can certainly say that most of them have been eliminated. Yet if we look to the future, we will see that a lot remains to be done.

We are entering our eighth year. During this year, we will have to carry out three major tasks: step up work among the cadres, expand our areas and strengthen our areas.

Cadres are decisive to the implementation of our political line, our ideology. That is, those cadres who have already waged an internal battle against the vices and shortcomings from the past, those cadres who have already assumed our new mentality, our ideology, those who hold the people and the Revolution close to their hearts, who create new ideas and fresh initiative through their work and who, among the masses and fighters, are the most vital representatives of FRELIMO, its objectives and methods.

Intensifying our work among the cadres means, in fact creating the conditions for stepping up ideological work among the masses, to further unite the masses and make the war advance even more. Our task is to raise the cadres' level of political consciousness and knowledge, uniting them even more with the masses and the fighters. This can only be achieved through the method of always combining the practice of combat and production with study, ensuring regular discussion, criticism and self-criticism, not allowing them to fall into a routine, ensuring study with practice.

We must continually democratise methods of leadership, so as to reach decisions collectively and always avoid the use of administrative methods to solve political problems. By doing this work we will create favourable conditions for expanding the combat zones. The more we advance into areas which are vital to the enemy, the more difficult the fighting becomes, the greater the abilities required of cadres and fighters and the higher the degree of mass mobilisation and organisation needed. By expanding the struggle and consolidating our areas, we force the enemy to further disperse their forces and weaken themselves. Our constant concern is to expand the struggle so as to give freedom to more people.

During the tough year of victorious battles that we have had, we gained very important successes. During the period from June 1970 to July 1971, the FRELIMO fighters wiped out 1,507 enemy soldiers, destroyed 261 vehicles, shot down 2 aeroplanes and 1 helicopter, attacked 59 Portuguese posts and destroyed 17 bridges and 4 trains.

The reason for these successes, what explains them, what made them possible, was our struggle to make the cadres, fighters and masses live by our revolutionary ideology and implement it in a vital way.

The seventh year started with the transformation of our armed struggle into a Revolution, with the intense battle to create a new mentality. The seventh year was the point of departure of the conscious development of the nature of our organisation, of its development into a vanguard party of the working masses in our country, a vanguard party with a vanguard ideology.

During the eighth year of our struggle, during the tenth year since the creation of FRELIMO, we must intensify this battle and work in a more thoroughgoing way. This means, concretely, greatly advancing the work of political education, especially among the fighters, and most particularly among the cadres, to make the fighters and above all the cadres living examples of the new mentality, active transformers of society, creators and promoters of our advanced, scientific, revolutionary ideology.

This demands greater vigilance of the masses and cadres, constant purification of our ranks, winning over militant elements and strengthening genuinely revolutionary comrades.

This action cannot take place merely in the realm of ideas. For ideas to live, to develop, they need practice, just as a plant needs sun and water. Concretely, our ideology must be given increased material form and must be something which is actually lived, both at the structural level and in day-to-day work. This means developing collective methods of leadership production and trade. It means stepping up the development of the people's committees. It means strengthening work in study combined with practice. We are entering this eighth year under excellent conditions, both internally and internationally. While assessing the internal situation, it is also important to consider the situation on the international front.

During the seventh year, our prestige and the international solidarity with FRELIMO grew, the support for our people grew. This year, Portugal was even further isolated internationally. Portugal found itself forced to leave international organisations such as UNESCO for fear of the disgrace of being expelled. In the imperialist countries allied with Portugal there was increased popular opposition to Portugal. Even within the Church, until recently Portugal's unconditional ally voices such as those of the White Fathers were raised against Portuguese colonialism and in support of our people. In Portugal the true patriots are demonstrating against the war and organising daring acts of sabotage against the colonialist war machinery. In the socialist countries, the African countries, the countries adjacent to Mozambique, respect for and solidarity with our struggle and people increased considerably.

All these victories are a direct and important result of the growth of our struggle. Our struggle is growing, growing both in extent and in strength. Our struggle is growing because we are growing. The results we achieve are created by our unity, the unity of the people, the unity of the fighters and leaders.

We are now entering into our eighth year of war. This year will be either good or bad, depending on our work. When we sow cassava, cassava grows, and when we sow nothing, weeds grow. The eighth year will be a year of great victories, because we are preparing for this, but it will also be a year of greater

sacrifice in which the enemy's crimes will be increased. During this eighth year there will be more foreign troops in Mozambique and there will be more and bigger bombing raids.

But we are also sure that, just as the seventh year marked the advance of the struggle to south of the Zambezi, the eighth year will mark even bigger advances. The eighth year will see us creating solid support bases, the eighth year will see us furthering the advance.

Everything that we are doing is the result of sacrifice. Our thoughts and our determination must derive stimulation and strength from the example of the comrades who, fully assuming our ideology and with the interests of the people in their hearts, have given up their lives for the victory of the revolution. Let us show our respect for the sacrifice of the comrades who have fallen by intensifying the struggle. In so doing, we will be accomplishing our national duty and also our duty of solidarity with all peoples, our internationalist duty.

LONG LIVE REVOLUTION DAY!
LONG LIVE THE SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR PEOPLE'S WAR!
LONG LIVE FRELIMO!
LONG LIVE THE MOZAMBIKAN PEOPLE UNITED FROM THE ROVUMA TO THE MAPUTO!





Session of the talks between the Romanian Communist Party and FRELIMO. In the foreground, the Secretary-General of the R.C.P., Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu and the President of FRELIMO, Comrade Samora Machel.

ALLIANCE AGAINST IMPERIALISM

A FRELIMO delegation led by the President, Comrade Samora Machel, returned from a visit to four socialist countries — The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania and the German Democratic Republic. In all these countries our delegation had talks with top leaders in order to explain the current situation of our struggle and to outline our successes and our difficulties.

There were several reasons for this visit as decided upon by the Executive Committee of FRELIMO. First, the socialist countries are our natural allies; we form an alliance based on the fundamental fact that our aims are the same: to build a society where oppression and exploitation of man by man will no longer be possible, a society geared towards the well-being of the people and their political, economic

The discussions of the FRELIMO delegation with the leaders of the Socialist countries, covering a wide range of topics, led to a better understanding of our respective policies and the strengthening of our solidarity links. Below we quote the report on the talks between FRELIMO and the Romanian Communist Party, published in *Scinteia*, the official organ of the R.C.P.

«On June 29, 1971, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, met a FRELIMO delegation headed by Comrade Samora Moises Machel. The delegation was in Romania at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

Other Romanian participants were comrades Paul Niculescu Mizil, member of the Executive Committee of the Permanent Presidium and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party; Vasile Patilinet, Executive Committee Deputy and Secretary of the Central Committee; Ghizela Vass and Ilie Radulescu, heads of sections in the Central Committee.

The discussion centred on subjects of mutual interest, regarding relations between the Romanian Communist Party and FRELIMO, as well as different aspects of the international situation, of the peoples' struggle against imperialism, social progress and peace.

The participants reaffirmed their common will to continue to consolidate the friendly links of collaboration, help and internationalist solidarity between the Romanian Communist Party and FRELIMO, with respect for the autonomy of conception and action, equality of rights and non-interference in internal matters. The representative of the Romanian Communist Party acknowledged the identity of principles which guide their international policy.

The Romanian Communist Party and the Romanian people will continue to actively support the just struggle of the Mozambican people for the liquidation of the regime of colonial oppression, for freedom and for the

and social progress. In fact, it is an understanding of this identity of objectives which has led the socialist countries to support us in our armed struggle for liberation. For they have been on our side since the very beginning of the struggle, supplying weapons, means of transport, clothing and other necessary materials. It is these countries, together with most African and Asian countries, who defend our people's aspirations and condemn Portuguese colonialism at the United Nations and other international gatherings. Similarly they have broken off relations with Portugal and recognise FRELIMO leaders as the sole, legitimate representatives of the Mozambican people.

Of equal importance, this attitude of the socialist countries contrasts radically with the position taken by capitalist countries. Thus if someone were to ask why we send delegations to contact the governments of socialist countries and do not send similar delegations to the United States, France, or Britain, for example, we would say quite simply: it is because those countries are Portugal's allies, they support Portuguese colonialism and are opposed to our people's aspirations. It is they who supply the weapons, money and «advisors» to the Portuguese government, which in the last analysis make her colonial wars against the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guiné possible. It is well known that Portugal is an extremely poor and underdeveloped country (the poorest in Europe), practically without industries, war industries in particular.

Were it not for the weapons, money and technicians that the imperialist countries supply to Portugal, there would be no war in our countries. For this reason we must consider them to be our enemies. This enmity has even deeper roots which lie in the contradiction between our ultimate aims on the one hand and the very nature of their society on the other. Thus capitalist society is characterised by the principle of exploitation of man by man: all the riches of the country are in the hands of a handful of big bosses, bankers and landowners while the people, exploited, receiving only a small part of what they produce, must submit to an oppressive system designed merely to guarantee for the capitalists a continuance of such exploitation.

Yet, we fight to put an end to these very evils in our own country! The capitalists have come to realise this only too well; it is not surprising therefore that they fight against us. Already we are an ob-

country's independence, for their inalienable right to choose their own social organisation, and to realise their sovereign rights in the international field, in accordance with their legitimate interests.

Both parties stressed the need to support all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces who fight colonialism and neo-colonialism, in all their forms; who fight racial discrimination and the imperialist's aggressive policy of dictate and interference in other peoples' affairs.

Both parties reaffirmed also the solidarity of the Romanian and Mozambican peoples with the newly-liberated countries who fight for the defence of their democratic conquests and of their national independence, for a progressive and independent development towards social progress.

The Romanian Communist Party and FRELIMO will continue to actively contribute to the reinforcement of the unity and cohesion of the whole anti-imperialist front, to the forces who militate for revolutionary transformation, to peace and understanding among the peoples».

Many progressive forces within the capitalist countries but outside official government circles, are active on our behalf in a number of important ways, opposing their own governments in a very radical manner. This same trip provided an opportunity for our delegation to renew contact with the Italian Communist Party. After the meeting the following joint statement was issued.

A FRELIMO delegation led by Comrade Samora Moises Machel, visited Rome at the invitation of the Italian Communist Party. Included in the delegation were Comrades Manuel dos Santos, member of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Department of Production and Commerce; Armando Guebuza, member of the Central Committee and Political Commissar; Salesio Teodoro and Sergio Vieira, responsible cadres. They met a delegation from the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party composed of Comrades Giorgio Amendola and Gian Carlo Pajetta, leading members of the Party and of its Political Bureau; Sergio Segu, member of the Central Committee and Vice-Director of «Rinascita», and Nadio Spano of the Section of International Relations.

The talks, which took place in the atmosphere of fraternal friendship and solidarity which characterises relations between FRELIMO and the Italian Communist Party, resulted in a reinforcement of mutual knowledge and friendship links.

The FRELIMO delegation explained the present situation of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in Mozambique, which is characterised both by a great progress in the level of political consciousness of the masses and by a growing isolation and destruction of the armed forces of occupation of the foreign aggressors.

It is this situation, reinforced by the extension of the struggle into new zones, in particular south of the Zambezi, that leads imperialism, namely through NATO, South Africa and Rhodesia, to strengthen its military and economic support to Portugal. This is confirmed by the participation of troops and material from South Africa and Rhodesia in Combat in Mozambique, as well as by the participation of foreign military advisors in the Portuguese offensives, who appear disguised as technical personnel; and by the support for Cahora Bassa.

The FRELIMO delegation expressed, on behalf of the people of Mozambique, their great appreciation of the action of solidarity with the struggling people of Mozambique and of the other Portuguese colonies, launched by the Communist Party and other Italian democratic forces. The FRELIMO delegation expressed their support for the struggle of the Italian people for the renovation of democracy, for progress and peace.

stacle to their exploiting the riches of our country and the work of our people. Increasingly, our struggle already well-known, is also awakening the people within their own borders, forcing them to think, to understand that they themselves are also exploited, and that it is possible to bring an end to such exploitation through revolutionary struggle. On every level we pose a great threat to capitalism and imperialism.

Thus it is clear, we must develop the struggle and strengthen the alliance between ourselves and those countries which by their actions and their political orientation are on our side in the revolutionary process. It was in this spirit that the Executive Committee of FRELIMO sent our delegation to these socialist countries. The mission was completely successful.

Reprinted from the August issue of FRELIMO national bulletin.

On their side, the Italian delegation explained the development of the struggle of the Communists and other democratic forces in Italy for the restoration of democracy, social reforms, progress and a new orientation of foreign policy in the country.

The Italian delegation confirmed the complete support and solidarity of the Italian Communists with FRELIMO, and expressed their admiration for the heroic struggle of the Mozambican people for the freedom of their country and for the shaping of a new society, free from the exploitation of man by man.

Both parties reaffirmed their support for the struggle of the peoples of Angola and Guiné, led respectively by MPLA and PAIGC, against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism. They reaffirmed their solidarity with the Portuguese anti-fascist forces and with forces all over the world from Indochina to the Middle East, from Europe to Africa and Latin America, who are fighting for the freedom of man against imperialism.

The delegation exchanged views on the international situation, and acknowledged an identity of viewpoints on the need to reinforce the unity of the anti-imperialist forces on the basis of equality in relations, independence and non-interference in internal affairs. On the basis of this identity and mutual concern in the building of a new society, both parties decided to reinforce their relations and links of mutual friendship.



GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The FRELIMO delegation was invited to the German Democratic Republic by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, and held discussions with leaders and the Political

Bureau of the S.U.P. In the picture above, members of the Central Committee of the S.U.P. of the G.D.R. welcome the FRELIMO delegation at the Berlin airport.

BULGARIA

Quoted from «RABOTNICHESKO DELO» official organ of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 12th June, 1971.

«The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Comrade Todor Jivkov yesterday received the FRELIMO delegation led by its President, Samora Machel, which is in Bulgaria at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

During their cordial and friendly conversation the President of FRELIMO spoke about their struggle against Portuguese colonialism for national liberation and expressed his thanks for the help the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian People are giving to the Mozambique partisans. He expressed the delegation's pleasure in visiting our country and said FRELIMO valued greatly the success achieved by the Bulgarian people under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the building of the new socialist society.

Comrade Todor Jivkov explained to the FRELIMO delegation the main directions of the Party's activity in implementing the decisions of the 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. He assured them that the Party, which is faithful to its international traditions will further assist the heroic struggle of FRELIMO for freedom, national independence and social progress.

The meeting was also attended by the candidate member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Ivan Abajiev, and by the deputy chief of the Department for Foreign Policy and International Relations of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Veliko Savov.»



Wreckage of an «Allouette 3» helicopter shot down by FRELIMO guerrillas in Cabo Delgado on the 14th July, 1971.

CABO DELGADO PROVINCE

During the period from 5 May to 18 June, FRELIMO guerrillas killed 73 enemy soldiers, destroyed 16 vehicles, attacked 1 post and 1 'protected village' freed 17 prisoners and blew up 1 bridge, in the regions of Ntandola, Chai, Ancuabe, Nangade, Mueda and Mocimboa da Praia.

TETE PROVINCE

FRELIMO guerrillas attacked 2 posts, 5 camps and a 'protected village' destroyed 15 vehicles and a tractor and killed 82 Portuguese soldiers from 6 May to 19 July in the regions of Nhaluwiro, Mkumbura, Chifombo, Fingoe, Malewera, Chicoo, Songo (in Cahora Bassa), Manue and Furancungo.

NIASSA PROVINCE

In the regions of Mbandeze, Mandue, Vila Cabral, Marrupa, Mandumba, Unango and Luatize, FRELIMO operations between 14 May and 17 July, destroyed 9 enemy vehicles, 2 posts, 1 train and 2 bridges were blown up. All this resulted in 36 enemy soldiers being killed and the freeing of 11 prisoners.

TETE PROVINCE

On the 23rd and 27th July, 2 enemy patrol boats were sunk with cannon fire on the Zambezi River. On the 8th August, the post of Malewera was completely wiped out by our artillery. On the 15th August, the post of Cacha was attacked and partially destroyed.

THE UNITED NATIONS: ONE STEP FORWARD



Over the years the UN has gradually been made to give ever more decisive support to action aimed at ensuring respect for the fundamental and inalienable right of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies to freedom and national independence. Following the condemnation of Portuguese colonial policy and the recognition of the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination and national independence, and following the declaration condemning apartheid and racial discrimination as a crime against mankind, the UN has recognised the legitimacy of the wars of national liberation; it considers the colonial war Portugal is waging in Angola, Guiné and Mozambique to be a threat to peace and world security. The UN has even gone further to declare all kinds of aid to the liberation movements to be both lawful and necessary and, finally, it has adopted concrete and positive measures, committing the specialised agencies to giving material support.

This evolution of UN positions on the question of the Portuguese colonies is due to the real and objective advance of the liberation struggle in Mozambique, Guiné and Angola, on the one hand, and to the development of political consciousness of world opinion and the action of the progressive and democratic countries in the UN, on the other.

ADVANCE OF THE STRUGGLE

We can take the example of Mozambique to show the visible progress made in the armed struggle for national liberation. Launched on 25 September 1964, the guerrilla war has now spread to vast regions of our country, more than one-third of it, comprising Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete provinces. One quarter of the country, i.e. about 200,000 square kilometers and a million people, are under FRELIMO's effective control. The colonial state, the superstructure of the system of exploitation of man by man existing in our country, has ceased to exist in the FRELIMO areas. The crippling colonial taxes imposed on the people have been abolished. Portuguese laws are no longer applied there and their administrative and legal machinery has been destroyed. The economy has been organised, on a popular base. Together with the development of internal and external trade, education and health services have been set up and consolidated. Under the leadership of FRELIMO, the Mozambican people are thus progressively giving material form to their sovereignty. In the areas under FRELIMO's control, a new and embryonic state machinery is already in operation, based on a new correlation of forces, now favourable to the working masses.

The emergence of this new political, social and legal reality in Mozambique — and also in Angola and Guiné — has had its international impact and has been accompanied by a steady development of the world solidarity movement. At the United Nations, in December 1960, the progressive and democratic countries, through their persevering efforts, got the international organisation to adopt the historic declaration on decolonisation, i.e. the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

A year later, in November, 1961, these countries won a further victory in the UN — the setting up of the Special Committee for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Spurred on by the Special Committee, fresh impetus was given to UN action aimed at ensuring respect for the fundamental and inalienable right of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies to freedom and national independence. Basing themselves on the progress made in our struggle, the progressive and democratic countries were able to make of the Committee of 24 an instrument which, within the limits and possibilities of the UN, won victories over Portuguese colonialism and its allies and

accomplices, the western countries in NATO. It was a long and difficult battle, as evidenced by the fact that although still known as the Committee of 24, the Special Committee now has only 20 members. Indeed, first Australia and, later at the end of last year, the United States, Britain and Italy, found that they were no longer able to prevent the condemnation not only of Portugal, but also of their own complicity in the colonial wars, and withdrew from the Special Committee. Portugal was condemned, NATO was stigmatised, the national liberation war was legitimised, foreign investments in companies operating in the Portuguese colonies were condemned and member states were urged to support the national liberation movements in every way. It was in this context that FRELIMO, like the PAIGC and the MPLA, were called upon to represent Mozambique, Guiné and Angola respectively in the World Youth Assembly at UN Headquarters in New York within the framework of the 25th anniversary celebrations of that world body.

ROLE OF UN AGENCIES

In the same way, having been urged to support the tasks of national reconstruction undertaken in the liberated areas, a number of UN specialised agencies decided this year not only to grant material aid, but also to agree to our taking part in meetings of their various bodies. In February this year FRELIMO, the MPLA and the PAIGC were invited to attend the meeting of the ECA Council of Ministers with observer status. In its conclusions, the Council of Ministers decided to recommend that FRELIMO, the PAIGC associate members of the Economic Commission for Africa. This recommendation will be put before the Economic and Social Council and the UN General Assembly for their approval in the coming weeks.

A similar step is being taken by UNESCO. Several meetings have been held in Dar es Salaam between delegations from UNESCO, the OAU and FRELIMO to draw up aid programmes. A delegation from FRELIMO represented Mozambique at the UNESCO seminar on colonialism and culture held in Dar es Salaam last July. In its conclusions, the seminar recommended that the liberation movements — FRELIMO, the MPLA and the PAIGC — should immediately become members of UNESCO with observer status and that subsequently, at its next meeting in June 1972, the UNESCO General Conference should accept these liberation movements

as full members. A meeting was also held in Dar es Salaam last September between delegations from FAO, the OAU and FRELIMO to draw up a programme of aid and to seek ways and means for FRELIMO to attend the various FAO meetings.

The positions taken by the specialised agencies of the UN are based on the fact that the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies are not only engaged in a just armed struggle for liberation, but also that they effectively control vast regions of their respective countries, where they are pursuing the tasks of national reconstruction. It is true that they have not yet set up a formal government there. But it is no less true, that according to the classical theory of sovereignty, its essential features — i.e. territory, population and organised central power, are already in existence. These features are undeniably present in the struggle of Angola, Guiné and Mozambique, where the central power is exercised by the peoples' Organisations — the MPLA, the PAIGC and FRELIMO.

Moreover, FRELIMO not only controls the liberated areas, but it is also guiding the people in the areas still under Portuguese colonialist rule. This has been demonstrated by the mass arrests in the areas under enemy rule. Last year 1,400 nationalists were imprisoned in Gaza, Inhambane and Lourenço Marques provinces between June and August. In June last year 18 nationalists were murdered in Machava prison. National consciousness is a fact everywhere in the country and, what is more, this consciousness is being expressed through the structures set up and directed by FRELIMO, both in the liberated areas and in the areas still occupied by Portuguese colonialism.

The stand already taken by the UN specialised agencies is an important contribution to the struggle of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies, both politically and in terms of international law. It is also an effort aimed at bringing international recognition of the rights of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in line with the new situation now prevailing in Angola, Guiné and Mozambique. However, despite the importance of the results achieved, it must not be forgotten that this is merely one step towards international political and juridical recognition of the sovereign rights exercised by the national liberation movements.

In the first place, the status of associate membership has not yet been definitively accepted.

IMPERIALISM OPPOSES

Secondly, and above all, the imperialist powers still dominant in the UN, oppose the realisation of the just and legitimate aspirations of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies to freedom, justice and national independence.


Moreover, there are certain governments which, while making statements in support of the national liberation struggle and claiming that they do not accept the myth of «overseas provinces», grant material aid to FRELIMO only for projects to be carried out outside Mozambique, in neighbouring countries. The reason that these governments put forward, although in a veiled way, to justify their refusal to support action programmes in the liberated areas is that they have relations with Portugal. This means that although they deny it verbally, these governments support both the practice and the myth of «overseas provinces» and, despite everything, still recognise Portugal as having sovereign rights over Mozambique, not only over the part she still occupies, but even over the liberated areas.

So the fight must go on. Determined to carry on the struggle until final victory, the peoples in the Portuguese colonies will continue to extend the guerrilla war to new zones and to develop and consolidate new power structures in the consistently expanding liberated regions. Through revolutionary violence, the colonised peoples will continue to inflict decisive blows on Portuguese colonialism and imperialism.

Internationally, it is necessary to continue to mobilise and inform world opinion on the victories won by peoples in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné, on their true significance and importance. This must be done to expose the machinations of the Portuguese colonialists and imperialism, and to make certain hesitant governments see the facts more clearly.

It is now more essential than ever that the relations that various governments in the world have with the Portuguese government should relate solely to matters of concern to the peoples and governments of those countries and the Portuguese people and government. When it comes to matters which concern the Mozambican people, governments and organisations must of necessity deal with the leadership of FRELIMO.

WAR



REVIEW

Just as Marcelo Caetano has put his own stamp on the style of Government within Portugal, this has also been reflected in his strategy for colonial administration. The basic assumptions, of course, remain the same — the maintenance of total Portuguese domination achieved by harsh military activity and repression backed up by increased psychological, economic and social pacification programmes.

These tactics have been considerably revitalised under Caetano by a more sophisticated approach and more active and efficient implementation, in three main areas:

- reorganisation and streamlining of cumbersome administrative structures;
- the more active mobilisation of support for the wars both in Portugal and the colonies, coupled with a greater appre-

Analysis of the Political and Military Situation over the last 12 Months.

ciation of the importance of 'public relations' efforts;

- more intense activities to win over the local population in the colonies with increased emphasis on 'social justice' and 'social economic development' rather than the previous crude 'trinkets and leaflets propaganda'.

The beginning of change was seen in Mozambique by the simultaneous arrival in March 1970, five months after Caetano took office, of a new Governor-General, Eduardo de Arantes e Oliveira, and a new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Kaulza de Arriaga. Their rule has been characterised by a clear division of labour between civil and military actions

while maintaining close co-operation and co-ordination. The armed forces undertake the military actions and much of the conventional psychological warfare. This is supported by the administration's provision of civilian infrastructure and services which facilitate the implementation of military strategy, and substantial contribution to the psychological effort by means of welfare, housing, settlement, i.e. 'development'.

REORGANISATION AND STREAMLINING

As soon as Caetano took office, there was a substantial reorganisation of the whole military apparatus. Upon Arriaga, the

new Commander-in-Chief's arrival in Mozambique, the various branches of the armed forces were integrated into a unified command to increase efficiency as 'strategic tactical forces'. Arriaga was granted greater autonomy for himself as Commander-in-Chief, and mobility of operational units was increased. He also indicated that more attention would be given to welfare of troops to combat growing discontent and desertion within the Portuguese military. The new Commander also replaced nearly all the chief military and naval officers in the country.

Co-ordinated and simultaneous with changes in the military, Oliveira announced a number of changes in civilian administrations and replaced four of the six provisional secretaries (heads of government departments), senior officials in charge of statistics, the economy, health and cereals, and the governors of Cabo Delgado and Zambezia Provinces. He has also indicated that the government plans to 'increase the density of the administrative network' — in other words extend the tentacles of administrative control. This has already begun with a comprehensive study of the whole administrative network, and the division of the largest province, Manica e Sofala into two provinces, to be called Beira and Vila Pery. The widespread introduction of such sub-divisions and sub-units at various levels in the hierarchy are designed to have the advantage not only of bringing the web of administrative supervision down closer to the peasants in the rural areas, but also to give more scope for the increased 'African participation' that is another important element of the new strategies. More significantly these changes can also improve the assistance that the district boards and the local government bodies of the provinces, provide the military operations and assure closer linkages of the two networks. For example, the implementation of the aldeamentos schemes (resettlement of the African population) is one of their responsibilities, and one that will certainly grow as increased efforts are made to regroup the populations in efforts to cut the people off from the liberation struggle. In 1970, Cabo Delgado received a special allocation of 23 million escudos (\$ 805,000) of which 13 million was for the improvement and extension of the aldeamentos network and the rest for other 'rural improvements'.

In coordination with this, it was announced in Lisbon a crash programme of white settlement in the colonies.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

Caetano's emphasis on communications and the use of mass media to put over his domestic policies, is similarly applied to the most difficult problem of all, the wars. Under Salazar, relatively little effort was made to actively involve the people in the war effort, apart from a few communiques and the constant assertion that the battle would soon be won. However, with the growing dissent and unrest this is no longer sufficient. Earlier this year during a visit to Portugal, General Arriaga appeared in a major press conference and television broadcast to explain in detail the major Portuguese 'victories' in Mozambique. He painted a vivid picture of FRELIMO — a 'communist, racist and tribalist organisation' engaged in 'organised banditry', and then went on to describe in stark contrast, the three main weapons being used against FRELIMO: the 'communication of the truth to the people, — convincing their minds and conquering their hearts'; economic and social promotion; and 'firm, persistent and quick military repressive action'. The military actions were sold as only being used against 'those who are the enemies of the Portuguese and who obstinately refuse our invitation of security and progressive well-being and opportunity for access to higher forms of life'. The propaganda effort is to put the emphasis on the positive and constructive, with military action as the last resort.



PORTUGUESE PAMPHLET. An old theme

Arriaga also stressed the importance of good propaganda, both at home and abroad, by way of communiques, interviews, exhibitions etc. and encouraging journalists to visit the war zones.

The sense of urgency about the need to mobilise and involve the people is most evident in the colonies themselves, with the press and other media being encouraged to take a more active role than before — of course under strict supervision. Taking up Arriaga's theme, newspapers in Mozambique report that everyone in Mozambique is responsible for the war, and that despite military actions the end is not yet in sight because all elements in the country are not united in the effort. For the first time in 1970 the press was permitted to report on the discussion in the Mozambique Legislative Council in which also for the first time, the Governor-General encouraged comments and open discussion.

'SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT'

General Arriaga has frequently acknowledged that the guerrillas of the liberation forces are advancing because they have the support of the local populations. His logical conclusion, therefore is that these two groups must be separated, both physically and psychologically. This is to be done by winning their hearts, by economic and social progress, and by military action. The Director of the Portuguese National Information Services, Mr Dutra Faria, has confirmed that such measures have nothing whatsoever to do with rights or justice, but are merely inevitable and necessary if victory is to be won. He has outlined five principles for 'the battle' social justice, respect for traditional institutions of different ethnic groups, economic and social development, increased African participation in public administration, and internal security. Three of these fall into Arriaga's 'winning the hearts' category.

A. Winning the Hearts

The Portuguese army has had a 'Psychological Action Section' for some time, but with little success, as guerrillas with increased popular support continue to advance. The reasons are not hard to find. In the first place the traditional methods used; rewards for weapons, leaflets in local languages, loudspeaker broadcasts from aircraft are quite impractical. The

peasant masses who sustain the guerrillas are on the whole illiterate and therefore cannot read leaflets; they see that aircraft come one day to encourage them to join the Portuguese and the next day come to bomb them. However, by far the most important reason for failure has been that the Portuguese, like so many other colonial powers before them, have failed to understand the true nature of the peoples' support for the war. They want to think that it is somehow just a question of material advantage, that the people feel they are better off under FRELIMO, and can therefore be bought or persuaded to return to the fold. Nothing could be further from the truth. Life under war conditions is very hard, sacrifices are constantly demanded, but inevitably the people are committed to the liberation of their country. They want freedom and a completely new way of life and nothing will buy them off from their determination to get this.

However, the Portuguese are trying new methods of reaching the people. One of these is the removal of minor petty injustices and grievances that can make a population restless i.e. 'social justice'. In this 'pacification attempt' there will be some revision of the minimum wage structure, which has not altered since 1956, and also changes in the Rural Labour Code.

Respect for traditional customs is stressed because of its crucial significance in the resettlement schemes e.g. around Cahora Bassa which the Portuguese themselves have described as a 'hyper-sensitive' operation. They claim that tribal custom will be considered in the area and timing of resettlement. With 24,000 people involved, it is a political necessity in which they cannot afford to have anything to go wrong! The experience gained through this massive resettlement operation will undoubtedly be applied in efforts to divide the Mozambican people.

The policies of 'divide and rule' and indirect rule through local puppet leaders has been used by every colonial administration. Certainly in Mozambique, the Portuguese make extensive use of corrupted traditional chiefs and leaders who then have a vested interest in maintaining Portuguese rule and are often the most effective means of political control. Last year the Governor of Niassa gave some local leaders military authority as officers. Later the Commander-in-Chief visited the area specially to meet the *regulos* there.

An emphasis on increased African participation in administering Portuguese rule is another aspect of Caetano's stepped up 'pacification' effort. Of course, this depends on the existence of persons with the necessary «moral and technical qualities» to exercise political functions — in other words people who would do as they are told. This focus involves local leaders in the rural areas, as well as hopes of integrating the educated urban dwellers in to the central administration. The African secondary school graduate in particular, though small in number, are an important target in this effort, for they must be given an outlet if their frustration is not to be channelled elsewhere. And their uses would not only be confined to the domestic sphere: their presence provides a vital element in propaganda overseas. It is surely only a matter of time before at least one African from the colonies becomes a member of the Portuguese overseas mission, most likely at the U.N.

B. Social Development

Such issues as social and economic development, only recently pushed by the Portuguese, were devised and are carried out as other mechanisms of control working hand in hand with the psychological and military efforts. As one British newspaper explained: 'The supreme irony of a war which still remains a thoroughly nasty affair for both sides is that it has taken the creation of FRELIMO to produce, after more than four and a half centuries of stagnation, a sudden upsurge in development by the Portuguese, so that they can justify their claim to be able to offer the Africans more than FRELIMO ever could'. Since his arrival in Mozambique Governor-General Oliveira has spent a considerable amount of time travelling around the country meeting governors and local officials and discussing local development problems. For the first time ever, at the beginning of this year a series of meetings was held with provincial secretaries and district governors in Lourenço Marques to discuss government programmes in rural development and administrative improvement.

However, quite apart from the more general long-term implications of such policies their actual implementation has very immediate and direct significance in the war effort itself. In addition to administrative changes, public statements have emphasized improvement in the welfare of rural peoples, better social conditions, health and educational facilities, and a larger

share in the economic wealth of the country for the people. However the methods Oliveira suggests indicate the political motivations behind the proposals, and the close linkages to military strategy. In the north, military action is to be combined with social, economic and cultural development *particularly through the establishment of new settlement and regroupings of rural populations.*

The Portuguese language is being promoted in formal instruction, but also by encouraging *closer contacts through increased settlement.* Added emphasis is also to be placed on *audio-visual aids and radio*, thus attempting to get out political programmes in as many forms as possible. Transition from a subsistence to a market economy is to be encouraged and legislation relating to land and labour relations in the rural areas are to be revived, as part of the overall effort to use «social and economic development» as an important part of the machinery to maintain political control.

(i) Education and Health

What precisely is intended in this field is not clear, and will undoubtedly be closely tied to the aldeamento schemes, to encourage people to settle there. On schemes around Cahora Bassa in particular this is particularly important. The Education Services and Roman Catholic Missions there will be able to provide schooling for 80 per cent of the 3,000 children of school age in the area. Social welfare programmes include child-care, home economics and improvement in nutrition habits. In Cabo Delgado in 1970, the primary focus was on a number of school post buildings, first-aid stations, 'residences' for local chiefs and administrators and radios for new aldeamentos. The content of education under these schemes is evident both from past experience in Mozambique and also through the importance now attached to radios (which recall similar American tactics in Vietnam). It will comprise Portuguese, the Roman Catholic faith some literacy and above all else, indoctrination of loyalty to Portugal. How widespread education will be depends on the resources available.

(ii) Resettlement and Settlement.

Settlement schemes are the most important method after military occupation for the maintenance of Portuguese colonialism. There are two main thrusts in the development of the schemes. For Afri-

cans the idea is to group them together and thus hopefully cut them off from contact with the liberation movement. Going along with that the Portuguese are pushing schemes for white immigrants to form a more permanent and reliable barrier. As the Vice-President of the Mozambique Provincial Settlement Board declared in February 1970, the implementation of the settlement programme under the Third Development Plan not only has an important political, economic and social significance, it contributes to maintaining Portuguese sovereignty in Mozambique, by ensuring a 'more balanced occupation' of the territory. The progress already made in achieving this 'balance' was indicated in the Portuguese government advertisement in the British Financial Times' in July 1971, when it proudly announced: 'From 1950 to 1960 the native population increased by 15 per cent while for the non-African populations (whites, Asians and mixed) the increase was 77.4 per cent for the same period'. Describing the Limpopo valley settlement scheme it said: 'It was intended that as a large number as possible of white families from the mainland should establish themselves in the villages of the Limpopo valley. Thus vigorous centres of settlement were established where the people owned the land on which they worked and practised the traditional virtues of the Portuguese farmer — tenacity, sobriety, love of work and the family.'

Which of the two forms of settlement are considered the most important is indicated by a comparison of the resources allocated to each. In 1968 40 million escudos were allocated for the clearing and levelling of 10,500 hectares for white settlement. As each farmer gets 100 hectares of cleared land, this meant 380,950 escudos per settler (i.e. double the costs of one aldeamento). However, in addition a white settler gets a further 150 hectares of uncleared land, a house, 25 head of cattle, passage for himself and his family, and financial assistance during the first year. 'Economic and social development as measured by income also confirms where priorities lie. In those aldeamentos where cash crops are grown, and these are in the minority, a peasant's income is estimated to be about 4000 — 5000 escudos per year (\$ 140); each parcel of land for settlers is expected to yield 130,000 escudos (\$ 4,500) — over 32 times more. From the large amount of resources the Portuguese are pouring into white settlement in comparison to African resettlement, it is clear that the mili-

tary, economic and political reality places increased settler support as a strategic necessity for maintaining Portuguese rule.

In Cabo Delgado the strategy seems to be the establishment of aldeamentos in the far north and a band of white settlement south of the Messalo River. In 1967/68, 50 settlers were established in the province. By 1970 this had reached 500 along the main roads. The aim is to settle at least 1,000 families in Cabo Delgado and Niassa by about 1975. In 1971 the Settlement Board allocated a further 200 million escudos (\$ 7 million) to settle among others 150 farmers around Montepuez in Cabo Delgado, 180 around Mandimba in Niassa, and 30 at Lioma in Zambezia.

(iii) Economic Development

Economic growth has a particular function in the context of Portuguese colonialism and must be considered in relation to the overall policies and plans discussed. So far it is discussed as a strategic front in all explanations of how the war is to be won. Portugal recognises that increased prosperity would go a long way towards securing adherence to Portuguese rule from the local populations, and would in addition produce more resources for the war effort itself. In the Portuguese National Assembly recently a Deputy from Mozambique stressed the importance of creating the necessary conditions for the 'economic occupation' of the territory as this was 'an indispensable measure to counter terrorism'.

Over the last couple of years, a regular feature of these discussions has been the necessity to promote the commercialisation of the subsistence farmer. Quite apart from the fat profits this would bring to the European traders and settler landowners, this is yet another method of promoting the militarily strategic 'administrative density' and regrouping policies. On the whole, peasants in Mozambique, the bulk of the population, are scattered subsistence farmers. And it is these


masses who are supporting the liberation fighters. Involvement in commercial production, no matter how small, would mean drawing this politically important group into a market economy, with all the surveillance that this entails. They would then become increasingly dependent on the Portuguese controlled economic structure, and have to come directly under the heel of the administrators. Economic back-up facilities could then be used to force them to move to prescribed areas.

Economic growth is also essential to solve some of the pressing economic problems of the territory, to a large extent the result of the complex system of economic integration in the escudo zone. Angola and Mozambique tend to have a balance of payments surplus with other countries which is more than wiped out by the growing deficit with Portugal — which grew from 2,417 million escudos in 1967 to 3,587 million escudos in 1969. This has caused considerable dissatisfaction among the settler population, because of resulting delays in financial transfers from the colonies to Portugal and the consumption tax slapped on many items in an attempt to remedy the situation. Given the present economic structure, the only hope is for each province to develop a foreign trade surplus which more than covers its escudo zone deficit, a very formidable task. But one that the Portuguese government is constantly stressing — that to solve their balance of payments problems the colonies must increase their production for export.

This logically follows, of course, not only because Portugal would be the prime beneficiary, but because for Portugal to exploit the natives is one thing, but to be seen gaining so handsomely at the expense of the settlers is quite another. Indeed, while the colonies' deficit has been increasing rapidly, and Portuguese investment income has also been increasing, Portuguese government expenditure in the colonies has been declining.

Balance of Payments of Portugal with the Colonies
in Millions Escudos and Dollars.

	1967	1968	1969
Total	2,417 (84.6)	3,059 (107)	3,587 (125.5)
of which			
Investment Income	660 (23.1)	771 (27)	1,063 (37.2)
Government Expenditure	1,763 (61.7)	2,385 (83.5)	736 (25.7)



WAR REVIEW

IN PICTURES





*The image of our victory rises clear
from our collective labour,
it has already the beauty
of revolution.*

*All the land will be ours
the world will be ours
We are freedom, comrade.*



That gun is bigger than the girl herself... Between battles, soldiers treat the wounded... An old man, undefeated, with his bow... Hungry for knowledge, children pour over their books... A few images from the daily life of our struggle for freedom.





FRELIMO'S ADVANCE WORRIES THE RACISTS

Cuttings from the S. African and Rhodesian Press

(From the R. «Financial Gazette», Sept. 17, 1971)

SALISBURY—The Rhodesian authorities are understood to be growing increasingly concerned over the security situation in the north-east of the country in view of the mounting activity of Frelimo terrorists in Mozambique.

While no major threat to Rhodesia's security is foreseen, there are fears that some side-effects of the Frelimo push on the Cabora Bassa area may be felt in this country.

Security sources in Salisbury are concerned that the Portuguese may be under-estimating

the capabilities of the Frelimo terrorists — who are much better trained and organised than the terrorists who have crossed from Zambia.

But indications of the mounting Frelimo activity in the area has been highlighted by the fact that they have started laying mines on the Mozambique section of the Rhodesia-Malawi road.

One man was killed this week when his car struck a mine, and severe damage was done to a pantechinon which hit another mine.

This week the Rhodesian government issued a warning to motorists that in view of these incidents the road "must presently be regarded as unsafe".

People travelling north of the Rhodesian control post at Nyampanda to Mozambique or Malawi are being warned that they do so at their own risk.

Portuguese army patrols are escorting vehicles in convoys from the border to both Blantyre and Cabora Bassa.

Security sources say terrorists have made several attacks on convoys travelling to the Cabora Bassa area.

• Concern was expressed by some Rhodesian businessmen after a radio news item reported that the Mozambique Governor-General's office had ordered strict control over currency dealings and placed a total ban on the export of banknotes, cheques, bonds and other assets from the country.

It was feared the Mozambique authorities might have introduced the regulations to avert any exodus of funds by businessmen alarmed over the security situation.

Banking sources in Beira, however, discounted these suggestions. The edict, they said, was merely a "reminder" of regulations which had been introduced in 1967.



Suddenly a mine-warning. Soon after this picture was taken five men were killed by an explosion.

A few metres further was another mine. This one was not detected.
The blast killed five men, blinded two. Others were badly injured. These were men I had been speaking to but short while earlier.
After the blast the convoy came under mortar attack.

The 'Sunday Times',
Johannesburg, August 8, 1971

EXTRACTS FROM THE 'SUNDAY TIMES' REPORT

For ten years, Frelimo, the terrorist organisation, and the Portuguese Army have been battling it out.

In places, Frelimo is the victor. In places it is in effective control. It collects taxes from the villagers and the farmers.

A much greater area is controlled by the Portuguese.

It is perfect country for guerrillas.

I learnt quickly just how perfect.

On the way to Mueda, a military base only 70 kilometres from the Tanzanian border our plane came under Frelimo ground fire.

One soldier was sick with the tension.

The plane was undamaged. But on landing, the streaks of lead on the fuselage were plain to see.

The danger of the bush was emphasised throughout our stay in Mueda. Not one day passed without the arrival of a helicopter bringing in wounded soldiers.

Salisbury, Friday.
The Portuguese Army Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Kaulza de Arriaga, visited the Tete area of Mozambique today and addressed soldiers and civilians as reports filtered in to Salisbury of new landmine explosions on the main road to Malawi through Mozambique.

A traveller said he saw a car and a truck blown to pieces on Wednesday and was told that three Portuguese men in the car had died.

The wrecks were a few miles from where a pantechinon and another car were blown up on an 89km terror stretch south of the Malawi border, he said.

The Chronicle's Africa News Service reports that a lorry driver from Tete was killed when his vehicle was blown up on Wednesday.

In one of the earlier explosions an Asian from Salisbury, Mr. Akrib Habib "Kay" Khan, was killed.

Portuguese troops are escorting all traffic north of Changara following ambushes on three consecutive days.

Three Portuguese soldiers died in one of these attacks.

A railway bridge about 4km from Tete on the main supply route from Beira to Cabora

Bassa was blown up early on Tuesday, cutting the line for at least 10 days.

Medical sources say Portuguese casualties from ambushes, shrapnel and incendiary mines have increased in the past few months.

An unconfirmed report says 22 soldiers died between August 20 and September 3, well above the usual average.

On Thursday, Mr. Khan stopped at Changara on his way south and saw a row of Portuguese jeeps riddled with bullet holes.

He was told that terrorists were ambushing vehicles between Changara and Tete, and also that a landmine had blown up a low loader on the Cabora Bassa road.

A Portuguese soldier is in Salisbury Central Hospital with shrapnel in his skull as a result of a landmine explosion in Mozambique.

MILITARY ACTIVITY

No matter how much increased effort is expended in winning the hearts of the people and building up the economy, as a means of pacification, Portugal's most important mechanism of maintaining colonial domination is military force.

A. Military Expenditure

While it is widely acknowledged that the wars place a great strain on Portugal's financial resources, it is difficult to assess the precise extent of this because of devices which split the budget into 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' revenue and expenditure. While most military expenses come under the latter category some, such as ministerial expenses are covered by ordinary expenditure. Though estimates themselves are always substantially exceeded, it is possible to get some idea of the general picture.

Portugal's Budgetary Estimates for 1971
in Millions Escudos and Dollars.

Estimated ordinary expenditure	19,617.9	(686.62)
Estimated extraordinary expenditure	12,431.7	(435.1)
Total expenditure	32,049.6	(1,121.7)
Estimated ordinary revenue	19,617.9	(37) (686.62)
Estimated extraordinary revenue	12,434.6	(63) (435.21)
Total revenue	32,052.5	(1,121.8)

a. Extraordinary revenue is 63 per cent of the total. Sources for this include besides the defence tax: development bonds foreign loans and substantial assistance from the Gulbenkian Foundation to the Third Development Plan. Therefore the role of foreign finance in the war effort, quite apart from NATO military assistance is considerable.

b. Under extraordinary expenditure by far the largest item, at 7,030.6 million escudos (\$ 246.071 million) and comprising 56 per cent, is the allocation for 'defence and security'. This is an increase of 10.6 per cent over 1970's allocation of 6,349.9 million escudos (\$ 222.246.5 million). Although complete information is not available on actual expenditure in recent years, there were at least five supplementary allocations in 1970, totalling 3,582 million escudos (\$ 125.4) which

alone increased the original estimates by 50 per cent to an amount equal to the total estimated extraordinary expenditure for that year.

c. The total of the 1970 estimates, the known extra allocations, and the provisional territorial budgets for military expenditure amounts to 12,930.9 million escudos (\$ 452.58 million) — in other words, \$ 1.2 million a day.

d.. There has been considerable unease among the military in Portugal at Marcelo Caetano's expressed concern for domestic social reforms because they could absorb resources required for the wars. At first glance it appears that their fears are being justified. For the first time, in 1971 the Portuguese budget states that first priority is to be given both to national defence and to public investments under the Third Development Plan. Although the amounts involved bear no comparison — 4,947.2 million escudos (\$173.15 million) investment expenditure — this is the first time since the

outbreak of the wars that defence alone has not had first priority. Moreover, while the defence estimates rose by about 50 per cent in the period 1965 - 1968 they rose only 25 per cent during 1969 - 1971.

Yet, at the same time the tendency to make the colonies self-financing, already mentioned with regard to economic policies, is apparent also in terms of military expenditures, as the colonies' military budgets have been rising sharply. The ratio of the colonies' to Portugal's total military expenditure estimates has risen from 29 per cent in 1967 to 47 per cent in 1970. This would seem to confirm the recent view expressed by one journalist, when speaking of Caetano's determination to pursue the war: 'Perhaps the main reason is that, while the balance sheet since the beginning of the war may

so far be slightly against Portugal, the investments in the past few years in both Angola and Mozambique should soon right the situation very much in Portugal's favour'. (Financial Times 19 July 1971). This is confirmed by the fact that at the moment it is Angola, with the most immediately lucrative investments in oil, that has been hit hardest, with its military allocation doubled between 1969 and 1970.

B. The War Effort

The great advantage of this great flurry of activity in the social field is its invaluable contribution to detracting attention away from the gravity of the military situation.

The Overseas Minister now speaks of Portugal's determination to win this war, which in the new propaganda strategy is described as 'a war for peace, a war for education, a war for economic development and a war for better health'. Although still insisting that 'force will be met with force', the emphasis is placed elsewhere. It is a new approach to an old problem, and a recognition that the tedious repetition that everything is under control, soon after to be contradicted by the army's own actions, begins to have negative effects.

Towards the end of 1967, the Governor-General of Mozambique told the Legislative Council that in Niassa and Cabo Delgado guerrilla activities had been substantially reduced during the year, with the help of the civilian and military authorities and the co-operation of the local populations. It had been possible to prevent further southern penetration and reduce the area of activity in the north. One year later he was still telling the Legislative Council that guerrilla infiltration had been 'progressively eliminated'. In February, 1969, on a visit to the northern provinces, the Defence Minister maintained that they would try to restore peace 'in the shortest time possible' — which was presumably the aim of the massive offensive that took place one year later. On another visit to Mozambique and Angola, in January, 1971, after the offensive, he this time maintained that the military reorganisation, together with a reorganisation of all counter-subversive activities would facilitate a global policy that would bring the day of final victory and 'paz portuguesa' closer. He described the military situation in Mozambique as 'highly favourable' with guerrilla groups in Cabo Delgado and Niassa yet again being 'systematically reduced' and infiltration in Tete 'being dealt with'.

For all the resources poured into that massive 1970 offensive, it is surely significant that the description of the military situation is virtually identical to that used four years previously. Indeed the fact of the offensive itself is the best measure of FRELIMO's strength and progress. In a special communique issued at the end of the year, the Portuguese proclaimed that they had engaged in 70 military operations (40 in Cabo Delgado, 20 in Tete and 10 in Niassa) involving 128,598 troops and other personnel. This number covered not only military but also extensive government and civilian services, including militia and other paramilitary bodies, civilian air and motor transport and civilian hospital services contracted by the armed services. 63,500 tons of material were moved. The air force logged over 11,000 hours of air combat, plus 3,000 hours of loudspeaker appeals to the local populations and the distribution of 1.7 million leaflets. There were 12,000 hours of naval patrols. All this supposedly resulted in the destruction of 61 bases and 165 hideouts, the capture of 1,804 guerrillas, the deaths of 651 and the surrender of 6,854 persons (guerrillas and civilians). And for the loss of only 132 Portuguese soldiers.

Portuguese casualty figures are always notoriously unreliable and losses minimized by such methods as attributing deaths by mines, the most frequent cause, to 'road accidents'. They even went so far as to claim that 80 per cent of the casualties in the offensive occurred during the movement of troops and only 20 per cent in actual operations. If this was so it must have been a very clumsy operation. Even more astounding is the way in which the Portuguese communiques contradict each other. The summary claims only 132 dead, yet individual communiques give 61 in May, 66 in June, 84 in July, 58 in August and 62 in September, a total of 330.

Even after all this time, the Portuguese are not capable of combating a guerrilla war. Bases are unimportant because they are always temporary, and can be established at any time and anywhere. With all their 63,000 tons of equipment they cannot hold on to an area the size of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. Not only is such equipment virtually useless over such expanses, the guerrillas have one great weapon they lack — the support and active collaboration of the people, as they have bitterly acknowledged. The main casualties of their terror operations are these ordinary peasants, and they serve

only to increase the peoples' hatred and their commitment to the struggle. And when the soldiers try to settle, the guerrillas attack and the enemy is forced to leave — as the Portuguese themselves admit. In a communique in January 1971, Portugal stated that despite the massive operations, not all the military objectives had been achieved, and FRELIMO had reoccupied some of its old bases. Shortly afterwards they announced the 1971 offensive!

CABO DELGADO

In Cabo Delgado the Portuguese objectives were: to seal the border to prevent FRELIMO fighters from going through (which was their first mistake, only supplies come over the border, the fighters are already in the country); to destroy the FRELIMO bases; and to stop our advance south of the Montepuez river. In fact, what is always described as an offensive, in that the Portuguese with vastly superior firepower and manpower, entered FRELIMO territory, was in fact a strategically defensive operation. General Arriaga said himself in March this year that the operations in Cabo Delgado had begun as a defensive action against a two-pronged FRELIMO offensive pushing south of the Messalo River. A similar guarded approach was taken by Oliveira at the end of the military operations, when he proudly announced that subversion had been practically confined to the north and north-eastern frontier and no administrative post had been abandoned. Surely, when an army goes into the attack, the possibility of an abandonment of established positions is never even considered, let alone mentioned as a probability..

(i) The extent of our activities during the year July 1970 — June 1971 shows that all Portuguese attempts to reverse the tide of the war in their favour, have failed. During this period, in Cabo Delgado there were 172 ambush and sabotage operations, 20 assaults on posts, which resulted in the deaths of 992 Portuguese soldiers and the destruction of 148 military vehicles.

(ii) Our operations on or near the main roads in February — June 1971 after the so-called offensive increased by more than 50 per cent over the same period in 1970. The roads mostly hit were Mueda-Vanomba; Mueda-Sagal; Sagal-Diaca; Diaca-Mocimboa da Praia; Mueda-Nangololo; Nangololo-Muidumbe; Mueda-Miteda; Miteda-Nangololo; Mueda-Nacatar.



A FRELIMO fighter

At the end of 1970 a U.S. made aircraft was shot down near the post of Nangololo between Mueda and Mocimboa da Praia. The markings were: No. 5401 II Modelo VELLV Z91R4 — 10 ABR — Part 2.275. 000 UNION N.J. U.S.A. A few months later, on 14 July, 1971, a French helicopter was shot down, again in the region of Mueda. It was an Alouette 3 with the following markings: SUD AVIATION 1, Ensemble No. 31605 25 22000.0 M 439 366 NSA 9110312. The NATO allies are good friends to Portugal, supplying much of the military machinery to continue the war.

(iii) Instead of being repelled, our activities south of the Messalo River have increased, and in the first half of this year comprised over 25 per cent of our actions in the province as a whole.

Moreover, the same time that the Portuguese were admitting that not all their objectives had been achieved, in another communique they reported FRELIMO attacks on Portuguese troops on the main road between Montepuez and Porto Amelia, 50 kms (30 miles) from the border with Moçambique Province.

(iv) As usual, an important indicator of our advances is the movements of the Portuguese themselves. During the last few months they have withdrawn from

posts of great strategic importance: 8th April – Oliveira, 28th April – camp Vanomba, 6th June – post Chitolo, 14th June – post Marere, 23rd June – post of Muidumbe, and 26th June – post of Miteda, – all in Cabo Delgado. These had all been under great pressure. For example, this year the post of Muidumbe was attacked on 18th January and on 22nd June and during March and April there were two ambushes on the road linking it with Nangololo and three mining operations, which killed 36 Portuguese soldiers and destroyed 9 vehicles. On the 22nd June, four days before being abandoned, the post of Miteda had been heavily bombed by our artillery. All these posts were completely encircled by our forces and supplies had to be delivered by plane, which made them very costly to maintain, as well as being militarily inoperative.

Another important reason, however, is the work of our comrades in Tete. For the intensification of the struggle there, particularly south of the Zambezi, has forced Arriaga to reinforce his troops in that province up to 20,000 soldiers. Many of these have to be drawn from Niassa and Cabo Delgado, from areas already considered lost, so that a new line of defence can be established.

TETE

In Tete the two main objectives of Portuguese military operations have been to prevent FRELIMO forces from getting near the Cahora Bassa dam site and to prevent them from crossing south of the Zambezi River. Both have failed, and the Portuguese are becoming almost paranoid about security precautions for the dam. The large-scale population movements required by the project are being used to the best military advantage by the Portuguese. A huge aldeamentos programme will stretch from Zumbo in the West to Chipera in the East, and is surrounded by a special cordon of armed police and the movements of everyone going in and out are checked by closed-circuit television. It seems that even this has not been sufficient, and last month they suddenly carried out intensive security checks on the background and credentials of all the European workers and their families.

In July, 1971, General Arriaga was proclaiming that the guerrillas were «having the worst of the conflict», although he admitted that there had been *15 known attempts* to infiltrate the dam area – of

course most of the guerrillas were always killed. But as a journalist recently reported: «Later reports have been less complacent, and a few weeks ago it was announced that the whole of Tete district, in which Cahora Bassa is situated, would be put under army rule, with a military governor taking over the merged function of military commander and civil administrator. Travel on the Zambezi to the dam site further upstream is in convoy and many roads and paths in the area have been land-mined. Officials working on African resettlement have refused to venture into the bush without an armed escort. Last year, movement in the area was unhindered.»

(i) Our operations in Tete during the period July 1970 – June 1971 amounted to 120 ambushes and sabotage operations, 31 assaults against posts resulting in the deaths of 426 enemy soldiers and the destruction of 94 vehicles. The increase in assaults has the enemy particularly worried as they know it required heavier weapons and much larger concentration of guerrillas in one area, than do other kinds of operations. Moreover, a large number of these took place during the 'great offensive' when according to the Portuguese the 'terrorists' were being routed. There were 12 assaults in July and August 1970, and the enemy were forced to abandon one post, Licope in Chufumbo, and concentrate more of their resources closer to Cahora Bassa and the Zambezi.

(ii) Our activity around Cahora Bassa has already been confirmed by the many actions that the Portuguese are taking and reports of foreign journalists like the one above. Our fighters have been particularly active with ambushes around Chipera, Chiuta, Chiringa and Chicoca. In April an enemy convoy of civilian vehicles escorted by military was ambushed on its way from Tete, when it was little more than ten miles from Cahora Bassa. A great deal of material was captured including high precision instruments and eight files of documents for the construction of the dam. No later than a month a shop on the Cahora Bassa road which supplied and housed some soldiers was destroyed. Two days later another convoy was ambushed and a Portuguese civilian captured. He was later released, in keeping with FRELIMO's policy of clemency.

(iii) The crossing of the Zambezi late last year has been a great step forward in the struggle in Tete.

The Portuguese claim that as a result of their new defence plans, FRELIMO is changing its tactics and terrorising the populations, especially south west of Cahora Bassa. This claim hardly holds any water even for the most sceptical. They themselves acknowledge that FRELIMO must have the support of the people in order to succeed, and would therefore hardly set out to deliberately arouse their hostility. This is yet another crude ploy to detract attention from the fact that FRELIMO is south of the Zambezi. They cannot deny it, and so try to discredit our activity there. At the same time they have launched a massive leaflet campaign to maintain control of the river by intimidating the populations along its length and prevent them from using the river at all. Thousands of the leaflets, in Portuguese and two local languages with clear drawings, have been dropped from aircraft. The text reads partly: «The population must not cross the river. The troops are going to kill the bandits who cross the Zambezi. The troops are going to set fire to all boats. Don't cross the river. Otherwise, you will die!»

The following is a summary of some of our more important engagements south of the Zambezi, from the end of December to the beginning of April:

21 December ambush road Mague-Chicoa
24 December ambush road Mague-Chicoa
15 January attack on post of Chioco
100 kms (60 miles south of river
18 January ambush Mague-Chicoa
17 February sabotage Chioco-Tete
4 March sabotage Mague-Tete
16 March sabotage Mague-Chicoa
27 March sabotage Chicoa-Tete
24 April post Mukumbura (in south of
province on border with Rhodesia
29 March sabotage Chicoa-Mague
6 April ambush Mague-Chicoa
10 April sabotage a road to the camp
of Mague
(Chicoa is about 40 miles from Cahora
Bassa).
22 May ambush Mague-Caponda
1 June sabotage road Chimbovo-Chicoa
13 June sabotage between the village of
Songo (in Cahora Bassa) and Tete
26 June ambush road Chicoa-Mague
27 June sabotage Mague-Caponda
29 June attacked a «protected village»,
6 kms. from post of Mukumbura.

(iv) The attack against the post of Mukumbura was heard by Rhodesian soldiers on the other side of the border and they immediately came over to assist

their Portuguese allies. However, their vehicle hit our mines and was blown up; three of them were killed. Portuguese revenge was swift and furious. Their alliance with South Africa and Rhodesia is too precious to permit such an outrage to pass, and they unleashed a reign of terror throughout the whole area. On May 4th several villagers from Champura, not far from Mukumbura, were arrested and tortured. One died. Three days later they entered the villages of Kapinga, Catacha and Mahanda, where they killed 21 of the villagers and the next day four more in Antonio. Two villages, Caponda and Canhembanhemba were completely destroyed and the inhabitants of these and others fled into the bush. When local missionaries protested about the atrocities, the Portuguese replied that reprisals would continue as long as FRELIMO was active in the area. Thus for all their talk about 'winning the hearts of the people', there can be no doubt which method of domination has first priority.

NIASSA

As in the other provinces, the main aim of Portuguese activities here has been to stop FRELIMO activity south of a strategic river — this time the Lugenda — and drive us back north. And once again they have failed. In June 1970, in the middle of the offensive, our forces derailed a train between Nova Freixo and Vila Cabral right down in the south of the province. The following month we shot down a helicopter in the zone of Catur again in the south. Our control over the province remains almost uncontested by the enemy as they are concentrating most of their resources in the other two provinces and relying more on such tactics as arming certain segments of the local populations.

In fact, one of the greatest difficulties

Portugal is facing in this Province is the lack of troops which is related to the great extent of the territory (128.960 sq. kms.). In order to remedy this situation the Portuguese have been conscripting elements of the population of the «protected villages» to fill their ranks. Last June, they caught all young people above the age of 13, from the «protected villages» of Messumba, Ngongo (Nova Coimbra), Chiuanga and Metangula and took them to Vila Cabral to receive military training and fight against FRELIMO. Those recruiting raids in the villages continue, specially in the region around Vila Cabral. Moreover, the Portuguese are capturing as many children as possible between the ages of 8 — 12, to accompany the officers into combat. During combat, the children are responsible for recovering weapons the officers abandon when they flee or are wounded or killed.

These barbaric, inhuman practices have increased the hatred of the people against the colonialists. The escape of entire families from the «protected villages» into the FRELIMO zones is constant: they come to ask for protection for their children, and to be allowed to participate in the fight against the oppressors.

Our operations are concentrated in the advance and during the last few months our guerrillas have been intensifying their military actions in the zones of Catur and Mecanhelas, in the far south, around the capital of Vila Cabral and also *inside the town itself*.

Occasionally the enemy tries a counter-offensive, as on 8th June when they tried to attack the zone of Maniamba. They brought in troops in 15 helicopters supported by two bombers and a reconnaissance aircraft. But our comrades encircled and expelled them, inflicting many casualties.

CONCLUSION

The year just ended thus witnessed very important successes in our liberation struggle; namely the expansion of the fight to cover the whole of Tete Province, its extension in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and consolidation of our control over the liberated regions, as shown by the fact that the Portuguese were forced to withdraw from a number of posts of great strategic importance. On the other hand, while Portuguese colonialism experienced an aggravation of its contradictions and faces mounting opposition in Portugal to the colonial wars, the unity of FRELIMO was consolidated and the determination of our people reinforced continually, further stimulated by our constant victories. For all their new strategies and techniques, and their mobilisation of ever greater military resources, the enemy have been unable to contain our liberation war. On the contrary, it has intensified in all areas.

The Portuguese have correctly identified the source of our success — the massive participation of the people, but are unable to combat it effectively. They will never be able to — because we are the people in arms.

The outcome of the war is clear. While we advance into new zones we start there the work of national reconstruction. Once the people experience the new life of freedom and co-operation that FRELIMO brings, they become the resolute defenders of those revolutionary achievements and proceed to spread the revolutionary ideas into the areas still under Portuguese domination. This is a continuous and irreversible process, which will go on until our country is completely free.



Our friends have never doubted our accounts, based on the grim personal experience of the mass of our people, of the horrors of Portuguese colonialism. Others look for more «unimpeachable» and «objective» sources, however. Since such efforts to devalue our own testimony generally spring from a fundamental lack of sympathy with our struggle, rather than from some fastidious pursuit of the «truth» of the matter, we are not too concerned to convince the uncon-

vincable. Nonetheless, when documents do become available which bear out the evidence of our own eyes there is some point in giving them as wide a circulation as possible so that they may be used in various ways by our friends in the course of our joint struggle against the Portuguese. The documents on the next page represent just this kind of material. In the paragraphs below we provide a perspective from which the documents themselves can be viewed.

END OF A MISSION

On 15th May, 1971, Portuguese colonialism again came under international attack, but this time from an unexpected source and with implications reaching far beyond the specific incident itself. For when the General Superintendent of the White Fathers announced that, after 25 years in Mozambique, the order would be withdrawing from the country, the Portuguese were being assailed from within their own system, as it were, and by a powerful body which they could neither silence nor persecute in retaliation.

What is the story behind the White Father's withdrawal? More important, what are its implications for our liberation struggle?

This issue is a long-standing one. It began when the White Fathers first arrived in Mozambique and received, among other instructions, this one from the Portuguese authorities: «Don't forget that your first duty is to make good Portuguese, and then good catholics. . . it is for that that we pay you.» That meant, concretely, that in their work among the people the White Fathers (as well as all other missionaries) should act as agents of Portuguese colonialism. Yet such an injunction inevitably created inner conflict among those honest missionaries who could not easily accept to be agents of an unjust, inhuman, backward, despotic — in short, colonial and fascist — regime. «This problem has been felt by us for a long time; it was not born overnight.

Why the White Fathers left Mozambique in despair

From the very first we became aware that the authorities considered us, wanted us to be their collaborators in the 'Portuguesisation' of the zone.» So commented one of the White Fathers, Father Mayte Barriain, who continued: «We tried our best to maintain a balanced approach, one which would allow us to continue in Mozambique, because we were concerned about the future of indigenous christianity there. For that reason we delayed our decision to leave up to a point where we were left with absolutely no alternative.»

In their official statements on the reasons for their leaving Mozambique, the White Fathers point out the dangerous confusion which had come to exist between the Church and the State in Mozambique, the ambiguity of a situation in which their presence had become a negative

witness, and in which there was a collaboration between the hierarchy and colonial authorities offensive to basic principles of honesty as they interpreted them. These were in fact the basic reasons for their decision. But the immediate reason, that which hastened their decision is also important, though not contained in the official documents nor as yet given adequate publicity. Quite simply, this factor was the intensification of the repressive action of the Portuguese Political Police (PIDE-DSG) and the troops against the villagers, directly witnessed by these fathers in Mozambique, especially after FRELIMO started the armed struggle in the southern part of Tete province. Thus they saw ruthless acts of brutality, massacres of populations, destruction of entire villages; it is such horrors which parts of their report, reprinted below, reveal. The missionaries tried to protest, but were told by the colonial authorities to «shut up and not mix in politics». And it was precisely the demoralisation caused by their impotence in the face of the arbitrary terrorism of the Portuguese police and military that convinced the White Fathers that their only effective protest would be to leave Mozambique, hoping, in that way, to call the attention of world public opinion to the evils of Portuguese colonialism. «We do not have any means of putting things right on the spot, so our presence only creates a regrettable confusion among the people with whom we work», they concluded.

While appreciating the inevitable limitations of their action, we welcome the stand taken by the White Fathers, both as a contribution to the international effort to counter Portuguese propaganda concerning the colonies, and as an effective attack on the Portuguese regime — all the more effective just because it attacks Portugal on her own ground. Here is a segment of the church (itself one of the mainstays of the colonial regime up to the present day) which not only criticises the regime's physical brutality (as many have done before) but which dares to challenge, on the grounds of basic Christian principles, the very foundations of Portugal's «Estado Novo» and of her colonial empire: the «civilising mission», the «multiracial society», and indeed the fact of «Portugal in Africa» itself.

The full repercussions of the «White Fathers incident» are probably yet to be felt, but it has certainly posed many new problems for the Portuguese government. Increased repression to control dissidents within the Catholic Church based on the presumed existence of a «red threat» there might prove to be stretching credibility a little too far. Yet the Pope receives «terrorist» leaders, the World Council of Churches gives them money, and

now the White Fathers also turn traitor. At home, two of this year's major political trials centred around the stand taken by priests concerning the colonial wars; one openly declared the wars to be wrong and a second was accused of actually aiding the liberation movements! Small wonder that there exists growing consternation and even confusion in the Portuguese camp.

Of course, there have been one or two moves to placate the restless. The exiled Bishop of Oporto was allowed to return and more recently the old hard-line Salazarist, Patriarch of Lisbon and Primate of Portugal, Cardinal Cerejeira has been replaced by a younger person reputed to represent 'a much more liberal faction in the church hierarchy.' But this is little more than window-dressing; the powers that control Portugal cannot permit any drastic changes that would open the flood gates of revolt. Moreover, precisely because the church does on balance remain such an integral part of the present system, we must be wary of overestimating its own capacity for internal change. Thus we must not be taken in even when the window-dressing referred to above is extended to the colonies as seems likely to be the case: already one hears ru-

mours that Portugal is willing to consider the appointment of African bishops to the two vacant sees in Mozambique, for example. But note that this «requires guarantees that the men proposed will have the right attitude toward her presence in the overseas territories.» Here in this latter phrase we return to the real problem. Welcome as the initiatives of the White Fathers are, tempting as certain marginal reforms within the Church or outside it, may appear, one fundamental fact remains paramount: there can be no really effective opposition to the Portuguese regime, at home or abroad, which is not based on a political analysis and organised political action. In the short run, the action of the Church may, as could be the case in Portugal during the next year or so, reveal cracks in the edifice and compound the regimes' mounting problems, but it is not such action which will bring that edifice crashing down.

It is on such a premise, of course, that we in FRELIMO continue to intensify our own revolutionary efforts; and on such a premise that we also call upon all individuals and organisations genuinely concerned to redress the situation in the Portuguese colonies to provide us with full and effective support.

The White Fathers' Testimony

1. 27th April, 1971: A mine exploded near river Mukumbura. One car was blown up. In the car were Rhodesian soldiers. Three were killed and two wounded.

2. **Portuguese Reprisals.** On 4th May the troops caught 2 African farmers. They were physically tortured until they confessed about their relations with FRELIMO. They said that they had sometimes seen FRELIMO guerrillas, and one confessed that his son had run away to join FRELIMO. The farmers were kept prisoners and forced to sleep in the bush. The next day, again under torture, one of them revealed that another man from the village named Aroni, had a nephew in FRELIMO. Aroni was arrested and interrogated. He denied ever having seen or contacted FRELIMO. Even while under brutal torture he continued to deny this, until he discovered that the other villagers had betrayed him and then he confessed that his nephew had in fact joined FRELIMO. He was killed immediately by three shots in the head. The aim of this murder, the Portuguese explained, was to frighten the other vil-

lagers so that no one else would deny having seen FRELIMO fighters. Aroni's body was buried three days later by the priests from the mission as all the people from the village (Changwa) had fled when they heard that the Portuguese troops were coming to finish them all off.

3. 7th May, 1971: Portuguese troops killed 14 peasants in the villages of Kapinga and Catacha. The names of those killed were: Guidilo, Miriano, Grizi, Zeze, Tapureta, Caropora, Fungurane, Pitroce, Maizi, Matias, Kenete, Diquissoni, Langisse and Jona. Very few men remained alive in those two villages. When we arrived there we found the villages completely deserted: everybody had joined the widows and children of the 14 murdered men who had fled into the bush. We saw a hole near the river Dak where 5 of the murdered men from Kapinga had been buried — badly buried. Six meters away from the grave we saw a human head, ribs, fingers and leg bones. The people from the village of Mahanda told us that the men had not been shot, but had been tortured and



This picture shows a Mozambican badly beaten by a Portuguese DGS agent in Tete Province. It was a DGS agent who told the White Fathers in Mukumbura: "The negroes only speak when they are beaten".

slaughtered. They showed us several heavy sticks stained with blood which had certainly been used to slaughter the victims. About 20 meters from the grave we found many empty Portuguese army ration tins.

4. On the same day, 7th May, the Portuguese soldiers killed 7 Mozambicans in the village of Mahanda. The names of those killed were: Chimuchamu, (he had a wife and 6 children), Ringuitori (with a wife and 6 children), Pensura, (wife and 4 children), Wacheni, (wife and 6 children), Joane, (wife and 4 children), Gomo, (wife and 1 child), Eanhadza Saimoni, (wife and 4 children). We were given these details by the wife of one of the dead men. We also questioned many people from the village of Mahanda who, through fear of the Portuguese troops, are now living in the bush: all the names and other details coincide with those given by the first woman.

5. 8th May, 1971: Portuguese soldiers killed four people near the shop of a Mr. Gabriel in the village of Antonio. The bodies were not buried since the villagers were afraid that the Portuguese would kill them, too, if they caught them burying the dead. On Sunday, 9th when the priests went to Antonio village to celebrate mass, as was usual, they found the village deserted. However, after waiting for a long time, a man appeared and explained to the priests what had happened the day before. They went down to the shop, and with the help of some people who, encouraged by the presence of the priests, came forward, they buried the four men whose names were: Januario, Charedzera, Kaswaswaira, and Chirega. One had been killed by 3 bullet shots in the head, another by several shots in the chest, the third decapitated and the fourth had had his stomach cut open.

It must be noted that all the dead – 26 – were local peasants. Some of them very old with grandchildren. The troops were not successful in catching any FRELIMO member – this we were told by the agent of the Secret Police (DSG-PIDE).

6. Talks between the Priests and the Portuguese authorities at Mukumbura.

(a) with the agent of the DGS.

The priests told him that the massacres carried out by the soldiers and the DGS were inhuman, cruel and contrary to all human rights because the villagers were innocent. The DGS agent replied (in the first discussion after the death of Aroni):

«Terrorism must be fought with terrorism. If you priests have no stomach for these things, then it is better for you to leave Mukumbura. In a guerrilla war there are no trials: one death in time can save many lives. Listen, my friends, don't concern yourselves in politics. Your role is to preach the Gospel. And I can assure you of one thing, it is now that you will really start hearing the complaints of the Africans, because our measures will be more harsh and drastic. The situation in this zone is extremely explosive and politicised by FRELIMO. The human rights admitted by Portugal at the UNO about which you are telling me, are «books» (sic) and here we do not care about books».

(b) with the Captain – Company Commander.

He said, «Believe me, fathers, I do not know anything about that Aroni: you may ask the DGS agent. But you must think also about the 5 men of my company who were killed by the first mine, and the 3 Rhodesians who were killed by the second mine». The priests replied that one cannot answer an unjust act with another unjust act, that people should be brought to trial and not murdered that way. The captain answered, «The villagers are guilty, because they are to terrorism what water is to fish». Thus we, the priests, concluded that the troops intend to finish off with the water – the villagers – so that the fish will die.

7. Those talks took place after the first death. Next Sunday, 9th May, after burying the four Mozambicans from Antonio, the priests had another talk with the Captain and the DGS agent. The latter said that the answers he had given at the last meeting had been the result of the state of his nerves (but the priests believe that this new attitude was due to a talk he had had that very day with his chief, Inspector Sabino, from Tete). The agent tried to justify the deaths in Antonio, alleging that the men had been killed while trying to escape from an ambush organised by FRELIMO – he said – in the shop of Mr. Gabriel. The priests knew from many witnesses that this was not true. The ambush took place three or four kilometers from the shop. When the six soldiers and the DGS agent, who had remained in the shop to guard the prisoners, heard the shooting, they fired on the prisoners, killing the four of them. They then shot at the huts, threatening to kill also the women and children.

We have reported here only the deaths of which we are absolutely certain. But added to this there is the inhuman and barbaric way of the manner in which the 'natives' are treated (tortured) to extract confessions out of them about FRELIMO. The DGS agent said: «The negroes speak only when they are beaten.»

8. All the people from Changwa, Zambeze, Antonio, Mahanda and Catacha have run away to the bush or to Rhodesia. The fields, ready for harvesting, are being eaten by animals; the people escaped with empty hands to save their lives. The villages of Caponda and Canhembanhemba no longer exist. All the men who had returned to Chanhembanhemba were taken to Mague: the troops arrived one night and carried all of them off. Their wives and children escaped to the bush for the second time.

9. 7th June, 1971: A brigadier arrived, member of the Justice Court of Mozambique, sent by General Kaulza de Arriaga, (Portuguese) military commander of Mozambique, to explain the situation. This envoy asked for a private interview with the Mission Priests. The interview lasted about 2 hours. In short, the brigadier's position was this: «If you priests arrived at the site of the deaths the following day, that is, Sunday, 9th May, I cannot believe what you are saying because your information came from the blacks and the blacks are liars by their very nature. If you want to know what I think, it is even very probable that FRELIMO, on the night of Saturday to Sunday, made that massacre in order to incriminate the Portuguese troops to the villagers». The Priests replied: «Mr. Brigadier, what you say goes against the most elementary logic. How can the people of FRELIMO kill their own brothers if, according to your own information, the local people for seven years are giving them food?» The Brigadier said: «You Priests must know for sure that for them there are no brothers! Do you know there are still among the blacks, tribes who are cannibals?» The priests understood that it was useless to continue the discussion. They thought better to invite the Brigadier to go and see for himself the places where the massacres had occurred for him to be able to confirm all that the priests had told him.

The priests's report concludes in this way: «May be because it was very uncomfortable for him, the Brigadier left shortly after, by plane, to Nampula. Before departing, he did not forget to recommend us not to waste our energies in political matters, but to reserve them for the preaching of the Gospel, thus imitating Christ who had never been a politician. He gave us other lessons as well, about the Gospel and Christianity courses.»

LA VERITA

Excerpts from The Truth (La Verita) a statement by Father Cesar Bertulli, former Regional Superior of the White Fathers Congregation in Mozambique.

«There exists in Mozambique a situation of injustice in which the Africans, who are unilaterally declared 'Portuguese' without any previous consultation, cannot exercise their fundamental human rights as regards their freedom, self-determination, development of their language and their culture. . .

«The regime maintains this situation of injustice through total control of the means of communication, illegal scrutiny of private correspondence, indiscriminate raids, illegal and prolonged detentions, threats and torture adopted as a system by government in order to frighten all those who do not accept the official policy, or are suspected of having relations with the patriotic liberation movement.


«This is the prevailing situation of injustice for anyone who has eyes to see. But

those who actually see it and oppose it, or who are not openly aligned with the oppressive government, who doubt the 'unique, aeternal and indivisible motherland', who preach the Gospel and its justice, are silenced, calumniated, tortured or reduced to a condition in which they cannot tell the truth: they are even invited to become informers of the DGS. The missionaries often are expelled after interrogations where the most absurd and stupid accusations are levelled against them by informers and prisoners who had been infamously tortured to 'convince' them of what they must say.

«. . . If the bishops doubt the treatment reserved for political prisoners and for those arrested for purely political suspicions, they must examine the photographs and documents which were given to them: through them they can become

acquainted with the 'cavalo marinho' (whip made of hippopotamus skin), 'pal-matoria' on the hands and soles of the feet, piercing pieces of wood under the knees, brutal beatings which normally result in the fracture of arms and skull, and often death, untold brutality in the genital organs until the victim loses his senses.

«And what if the shepherds experienced in their own flesh what so generously is reserved for their sheep? May be their view would be clearer and they would change their minds and would denounce the state of injustice that is the primary cause of all other injustices. For what is the use of denouncing privately one or the other of the innumerable injustices, if the cause from which they spring is not denounced? . . .»



Oleg Ignatiev (above), a foreign affairs specialist with «Pravda», the Soviet Communist Party's daily newspaper, recently visited Cabo Delgado Province at the invitation of FRELIMO.

His travels previously had taken him to Vietnam and to the liberated areas of Angola and Guiné but this was his first trip to Free Mozambique. We quote his impressions on the visit:

PRAVDA'S ENVOY REPORTS

Recently I spent nine days in Mozambique, travelling over 200 miles inside the liberated regions. Before I went to Mozambique, I had read some Portuguese propaganda claiming they had launched a «decisive» battle against FRELIMO, but I found no evidence of any major Portuguese offensive inside the country. In fact, we passed quite close to a Portuguese military post. But all was quiet. It was as if the Portuguese soldiers were hostages inside their tiny quarters. All they ever did was to occasionally shoot out into the bush surrounding their camp in the hope of frightening away the Mozambicans.

Outside of the Portuguese military bases the FRELIMO forces control everything. Even the roads are mined so successfully the Portuguese cannot travel on them. Their supplies and communications have to be flown in. The people and the guerrillas, on the other hand, know how to travel the roads without being caught by the mines.

Travelling with some of the freedom fighters, I found they were extremely well disciplined. Their level of military training and skill is very high, but perhaps most important, I could see that the fighters and the people living in the villages worked together on many levels in the struggle to defeat the Portuguese and liberate their country. When the fighters

VISITORS IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE

enter a community the people immediately give them food and a place to sleep. There would also be a meeting so that the villagers can hear the latest news of the struggle.

On one occasion we entered a village with one of the FRELIMO leaders, Comrade Chissano. About 300 people, men women and children, quickly gathered for a meeting. Comrade Chissano first asked about the problems of the village, such as food, clothing and other supplies. These needs were adequately met, the villagers felt, but people were very concerned that they were not yet able to destroy the Portuguese planes which flew overhead and attacked the villages. Comrade Chissano encouraged them, and asked them to recall a few years earlier when they only had rifles. «Things change as the struggle grows. In the future you will certainly have even more powerful weapons».

The openness of the discussion between the leaders and the people was very impressive. I could see how Comrade Chissano was so genuinely interested in the people's problems and would do everything that he could to improve their situation. Also, the determination of the villagers to put the fight against the Portuguese and the struggle for a free Mozambique above any other needs such as food or clothing greatly increased my respect for them and for their struggle.

The high level of organisation by FRELIMO of the many different activities they conduct inside Mozambique was also very impressive. There were hospitals and schools, transportation and communication networks, and agriculture and commerce. They all were handled in an orderly and efficient manner.

I was fortunate to be able to visit a boarding school for primary school students from many parts of the liberated territory. I found that the students never complained about a lack of food or clothing, or their busy schedules. They were keen to learn and to prepare themselves for the struggle.

The four year academic programme is integrated with agricultural work in which the students grow their own food and receive military training to learn to defend themselves. All these are essential to the development of the struggle.

While in Mozambique I met people from many different tribes, yet I never saw evidence of tribalism. Such divisions keep people apart from each other and only help the enemy. For example, I attended a festival and heard songs of several different tribes as well as songs in Portuguese. There were a number of tribal dances performed, and people wore different tribal costumes. In this way the traditional customs are maintained, but the songs, dances and dress are shared and exchanged by all.


I visited a special co-operative inside Mozambique for making Makonde sculpture. This artistic work is famous throughout the world. Sometimes when people are wounded in the fighting, they join this co-operative and are taught how to carve. In this way they are still part of the struggle.

In one village there was an orphanage for small children whose parents had been killed by the Portuguese. I was told a story of a small four month old girl who had been found strapped to her dead mother's back by some peasants who returned to the area a day after a Portuguese bombing raid had occurred. The peasants had cared for the child and travelled a week's journey to bring her to the orphanage. The people feel responsibility for everyone and care for each other,

Generally the people live a reasonably normal life, even in areas close to the Portuguese camps. In the past, the Portuguese have often destroyed many of the cultivated areas, but this year the crops are reported to be doing very well. The peasants have learned how to escape the Portuguese raids; and then, as soon as they are over, they return to their work in the fields.

During one meeting with a village, Portuguese planes flew overhead and dropped bombs in the forest a short distance away. We could see the bombs fall and hear explosions. After it was over, a few people went to inspect the damage. I wondered why the Portuguese just let the bombs drop without a definite target in mind. I was told the intention of the Portuguese was first to scare the people. Most of their bombs land in the forest. Only a few ever hit villages or destroyed crops these days.

Having been to Vietnam three times, I can see many similarities between the struggle there and the struggle in Mozambique. The United States government and the Portuguese colonialists have used a similar strategy of strategic hamlets, napalm and bombing to achieve similar objectives. But, in the end, both will fail. The invaders will be driven out. By what I could see, I am convinced that the Mozambique people led by FRELIMO will win their struggle for liberation.»



Soviet news team sees Tete's fighting spirit

A five-man team of journalists and cameramen from the Soviet Union visited Tete Province shortly after Mr. Ignatiev's visit to Cabo Delgado. The group, who represented «Izvestia», «Komsomolskaya Pravda», radio and television, are seen here in discussion with FRELIMO during the visit. Below we print the conclusions of two of the visitors.



«I am very glad to have had the chance to visit and live in the liberated areas of Mozambique together with four of my colleagues as guests of FRELIMO in the Province of Tete. We were in Mozambique for about 15 days. In this short time I learnt many interesting things about the life of the Mozambican people, about their decision to carry on until final victory their armed struggle for national liberation. In the free regions of Tete Province, I saw people, under the leadership of their vanguard organisation, FRELIMO, building a new life. They elect their political organs, create schools, organise medical assistance. All this was very impressive. Equally impressive was the discipline and high morale and fighting spirit of the guerrilla fighters. Every militant, from the rank and file to the leaders, is a conscientious, responsible and active FRELIMO fighter, who fights on behalf of his people for the progress of his country.»

ORDGE XACHAEV – Radio and Television

«During the time I was in Tete Province with FRELIMO, the deepest impression was made on me by the FRELIMO President, Comrade Samora Machel. His energy, strong will and high spirit had an effect on every soldier – and on we Soviet journalists and cameramen. I was particularly impressed by the way Comrade Samora talks with the masses, with the people from all levels – soldiers, peasants, workers, women and children. The FRELIMO President knew always how to find a common language – a language based on the feelings and mood of the people. He himself comes from the people, and therefore knows the psychology of the peasants and their needs and problems. When talking at people's meetings he knows how to find the proper examples, the correct comparisons, related to daily life, thus entering deeply into the hearts and mind of the people. Those meetings are truly schools for the education of the masses. FRELIMO has a leader of stature.»

PAVEL MIKHAILEV – from «Komsomolskaya Pravda»

A glimpse of tomorrow's Mozambique

« In 1968 I spent some time in the guerrilla bases of Guine-Bissau. In 1969 I was in the war zones of Angola. Now as a member of a team of Soviet journalists and cameramen, I have spent two weeks in Mozambique, in Tete Province. I found this the most interesting visit so far.

This was mainly because we were the first foreigners to visit this Province as guests of FRELIMO. But also because the Portuguese colonialists are desperately trying to destroy FRELIMO in Tete. It is here that they plan to build the Cahora Bassa Dam — which would strengthen the alliance of the imperialists, colonialists and racists and thus become a threat not only to the people of Mozambique, but to the whole of Africa.

I have read articles in the Portuguese press where 'victory' of the Portuguese

army is constantly claimed. The Portuguese say that the guerrillas have been wiped out in Tete, and that FRELIMO no longer exists. This is pure nonsense. We visited guerrilla bases. We spoke with fighters, detachment commanders and political commissars. We have been in regions where the colonial regime was totally liquidated. In those regions, another power stands, functioning on behalf of the people and for the good of the people. This power is FRELIMO power. Children are studying in schools built and run by FRELIMO.

The people receive medical assistance from FRELIMO. The peasants become owners of their lands. In short, FRELIMO is the only government in the liberated areas. And the government of FRELIMO is the government of the Mozambique of the future. »



In this article, Anatole Nicanorov (above) special envoy of «Izvestia», describes his visit to Tete Province. (Below: the five Soviet newsmen on their march through Tete with FRELIMO).



VISITORS IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE



Kid Alfors was the guest of FRELIMO in the liberated Province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, in August of this year.

Coming from Finland, he began working with the publishing house of the Mozambique Institute (MIPRINT) in July, 1970. His task was to establish the publishing house and begin training our comrades to operate the off-set equipment given to the Institute by the Finnish Union of Secondary School Students (SUOMEN TEINILIITTO). The funds for MIPRINT were raised by the students in their 'Day of Work' campaign in 1969-70. SUOMEN TEINILIITTO will devote the funds of their 1971-72 campaign to aid schools in Free Mozambique.

In Mozambique Kid saw some of the FRELIMO schools where the new textbooks of MIPRINT will be used, and has now returned to Finland to assist the students in this year's campaign.



GUINÉ : 12 YEARS AFTER PIJIGUITI

On 3rd August, 1961, the PAIGC proclaimed the initiation of DIRECT ARMED ACTION by the people of Guiné and Cape Verde against Portuguese colonialism.

Two years before, on 3rd August, 1959, the massacre of Pijiguiti took place. On that day the workers at the river port of Pijiguiti in Guiné declared a strike, demanding better working conditions and decent salaries. In response the Portuguese Government sent in troops — 50 workers were massacred.

This crime by the Portuguese colonialists was definite proof for the people of Guiné and Cape Verde that only by revolutionary violence would they be able to realise their aspirations for liberty and independence.

It was thus that the armed struggle appeared as an urgent historical need, the responsibility of which PAIGC knew how to assume completely. So, on 3rd August, 1961, once realising the necessary conditions, PAIGC proclaimed the initiation of direct armed action. Starting with sabotage actions, the struggle developed progressively and, finally in January, 1963, the peoples guerrilla war was definitely launched.

Since then the guerrilla warfare has developed until it has actually attained a level which now covers four fifths of Guiné. Vast areas of the country are now free, controlled and administered by PAIGC, areas over which the people of Guiné directly exercise their right of sovereignty.

PAIGC has undertaken the development of the economy in the liberated zones, and at the same time created services for


education, health, etc. necessary for the reconstruction of a new life. Under the direction of PAIGC in Guiné, a new society, free from the exploitation of man by man is being constructed.

Parallel to this, PAIGC continues to extend and consolidate military activities. The recent attack on Bissau, the capital of the country, was a great victory against the Portuguese army and demonstrates the development attained by the struggle and the fighting capacity of the PAIGC fighters.

Portuguese colonialism, to try and halt the advance of PAIGC, uses manoeuvres against the people, promising them equal rights for all, Guineans and Portuguese, and speaks about social advances for the population. These manoeuvres have completely failed, because the Guineans, militant and conscious, refuse any kind of compromise, also because the reality is such that even if she wishes, Portugal does not have the possibility to do this by virtue of the dimension attained by the revolutionary struggle.

Simultaneously, Portugal has made criminal aggressions against countries neighbouring Guiné. The more recent examples are the attack against Senegal and the ignoble failure of the attempted invasion of the Republic of Guinea.

However, nothing will deter the struggle of the peoples of Guiné and Cape Verde. And neither will the military, financial and political support Portugal continues to receive from the member countries of NATO, especially U.S.A., Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, etc. support which permits Portugal to continue to wage three colonial wars, in Guiné, in Angola and in Mozambique.



The great victories obtained by PAIGC constitute an invaluable contribution for the complete liquidation of Portuguese colonialism on our continent.

And because of the development attained by the struggle, and also by its revolutionary character, PAIGC activities are a valid contribution to the total and complete liberation of Africa and for the victory of the African Revolution.

On commemorating the national day of the peoples of Guiné and Cape Verde, we salute the memory of the martyrs of Pijiguiti and all the heroic combatants of PAIGC who have fallen so that Africa can be free, and we celebrate the great victories obtained by the PAIGC in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism for the construction of a free and independent motherland.

New victories will continue to crown the actions of the combatants and leadership of PAIGC and of all the peoples of Guiné and Cape Verde Islands.

Long Live the PAIGC!
Long Live the Heroic struggle of
the Peoples of Guiné and Cape
Verde!

Long Live the Unity between
PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO!

UNIDOS VENCEREMOS!



história de moçambique

